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I. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(i), Utah Code 
Annotated, as this is an appeal from a final Order of the District Court. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings Below. 
The proceedings at issue arose out of a Decree of Divorce between the parties 
entered on April 8, 1992. Commencing in 1995, numerous hearings took place occasioned by 
Mr. Odak's failure to pay certain IRS obligations, resulting in the garnishment of Ms. Odak's 
alimony payments. (R.268-69, 328-29). 
The matter was heard by the Honorable Pat. B. Brian on October 30, 1997. At 
issue were the motions of Ms. Odak to reduce the alimony arrearages to judgment, collect 
attorney's fees, and have Mr. Odak found in contempt. Mr. Odak argued his motion to 
terminate alimony based on cohabitation (which motion was denied), and his motion seeking a 
finding of contempt arising out of an alleged violation of a non-denigration clause in the Decree 
of Divorce. 
Prior to the hearing, in a telephonic conference call, counsel and the Court agreed 
that the matter could be presented to the Court by way of proffers of testimony. At the 
commencement of the hearing, the Court reiterated that agreement, and added that the Court 
could then determine whether it wanted to hear additional evidence. (R409). The only persons 
present in the Court room at the hearing who could have been called as witnesses to testify were 
the parties themselves. 
Counsel for Mr. Odak commenced the proffer (R409-425). Counsel for Ms. 
Odak responded with a proffer based on the deposition testimony of witnesses taken in Ohio 
(R425-430). Counsel for Mr. Odak was then given the opportunity to respond, which he did 
(R430-437). He was given another opportunity to comment with regard to the contempt issue, 
which, incidentally, counsel for Mr. Odak characterized as the issue of "defamation." (R441-
447). After further discussion between the Court and counsel regarding calculation of 
arrearages, the Court inquired as to whether counsel would submit the pending issues for ruling. 
Both counsel submitted the issues (R451). At no time did counsel for Mr. Odak request the 
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opportunity to call witnesses or present additional evidence other than the proffers that were 
made to the Court. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. At the October 30, 1997 hearing, the Court, by agreement with counsel, 
took proffers of proof from the parties. Neither party requested that the Court take any 
additional evidence at the hearing. (R409-458). 
2. After Mr. Odak's proffer of evidence, a proffer with regard to the 
contempt issue was made on behalf of Ms. Odak. Among the matters proffered were a 
challenge to the credibility of Mr. Odak's main witness who had told Ms. Odak that her husband 
had been murdered by the mob, but then testified that she thought the FBI had murdered him 
(R426), that Ms. Odak had simply expressed that Mr. Odak is a very powerful person and that 
she is afraid of and intimidated by him (R427). The responsive proffer further indicated that 
Mr. Odak essentially could not describe any business relationship that he claimed had been 
harmed by the alleged statement of Ms. Odak, with the exception of a speculative relationship 
with a bank for which he might do consulting (R428), and the only personal relationship that he 
could describe that might have been affected was one with a resident of Ms. Odak's small town 
whom he had not even seen since 1992 (R428-429). 
At the conclusion of Ms. Odak's proffer, additional comment and proffer was 
made by counsel for Mr. Odak not one, but two additional times (R430-432, R441-442). 
3. No request was made for either side to have the Court hear additional 
evidence, and the matter was submitted to the Court for resolution (R451). 
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4. The Court granted to Ms. Odak judgment for alimony arrearages with 
interest, awarded attorney's fees and costs, denied both motions for contempt, found that Mr. 
Odak had not proven his claim of defamation, and dismissed the claim of cohabitation (R452-
457). 
in. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 
A. The parties agreed to proceed by proffer. Mr. Odak did not request that 
the Court take additional evidence, did not object to the manner in which the hearing was 
conducted, agreed that the matter could be submitted on the basis of the proffers made to the 
Court, and cannot now object to the findings of the Court on the basis that additional evidence 
was not taken. 
B. Both the Court and Mr. Odak used the terms "denigration" and 
"defamation" interchangeably. At no time did Mr. Odak object to the Court considering the 
issue of defamation, and his right to challenge the Court's findings on that basis was waived. 
C. Ms. Odak is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs on an appeal. 
Ms. Odak was awarded attorneys fees in the Court below, and as a prevailing party in this 
Appeal, should be awarded her fees and costs incurred in defending this matter. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Mr. Odak agreed to the procedure to take evidence and argument employed 
by the trial court. It is undisputed that he did not, at any time, raise an objection to the 
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procedural course of the proceedings, did not ask the Court to take additional evidence and 
specifically submitted all issues to the Court for decision at the conclusion of the hearing. 
Clearly, he has not preserved the issue for appeal. The instant proceeding is quite similar to the 
situation in Jenkins v. Weis, 868 P2d 1374 (Utah App. 1994), in which the plaintiff in a 
defamation action appealed the decision of the trial court that defendant was a public figure. In 
affirming the Court's ruling, the Court of Appeals noted: 
...He does not contend that he objected to the motion, objected to the 
ruling, asked that the motion proceedings be placed on the record, or 
requested additional time to respond. Jenkins, by his failure to take any 
affirmative actions at trial, has not preserved the issue for appeal. IdL at 
1374 (citations omitted). 
B. Mr. Odak asked the Court to make fact findings regarding certain 
statement allegedly made by Ms. Odak. Although the language of the Divorce Decree spoke 
in terms of "denigration", Mr. Odak, by way of comments of his counsel, used the term 
"defamation" in the hearing at least four different times. First, he tells the Court: 
"Secondly, we filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause, in re: Contempt, with 
respect to violation of the Divorce Decree, in that Mrs. Odak has been making 
defamatory and denigrating statements against Mr. Odak, in violation of the 
Divorce Decree." (R413). 
Again, counsel for Mr. Odak states: "I think I am going to be real brief on 
defamation." (R423). 
Later, counsel for Mr. Odak asks the Court, "Can you seriously argue that the 
statements that have been made against Mr. Odak are not defamatory, are not likely to 
negatively affect his personal, professional or business relationships?" (R432) 
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Finally, counsel again is given an opportunity to discuss the matter with the Court, 
and states, "One last word on the defamation." (R441). 
Indeed, in Mr. Odak's brief he sets forth a definition of "denigrate" which 
includes the synonym "defame". The bottom line is that Mr. Odak agreed with the procedure 
to be followed by the Court, never objected to it, asked the Court on several occasions to make 
findings with regard to an alleged claim of defamation, and simply did not like the answer the 
Court gave him with regard to the requested findings. There is no error of law as argued by 
the Appellant and the Appeal should be dismissed. 
C. In the course of the proceedings, Ms. Odak was awarded attorney's fees 
on two different occasions. At the hearing in October of 1997, the Court awarded to Ms. Odak 
attorney's fees and costs of $10,000.00. The Court further ordered that those fees and costs 
would be forgiven if Mr. Odak paid all judgments in their entirety before December 1, 1997 
(R455). It is well-settled that the party who was awarded attorney fees below and who prevails 
on appeal is entitled to an award of fees reasonably incurred on appeal. Management Services 
Corp. v. Development Associates., 617 P.2d 406, 408-409 (Utah 1980). As the party who 
fulfills both of these conditions, Ms. Odak is entitled to an award of fees on appeal. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidentiary procedure employed by the Court was proper and agreed to by 
the parties, and the Court properly found that Mr. Odak had not established a claim of 
defamation. 
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Respectfully submitted this s ^ l 
~r 
day of September, 1998. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
>
~£tf__^ 
LNN WASSERHANN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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